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Abstract:
The objective of this paper is to identify how historical process and changing political 
ideologies have affected the responses of MNEs to investment in Chile. Using the 
historical dimension we provide a trajectory of development along which the Chilean 
economic system influenced by shifts in political ideologies has evolved. For each section 
we categorized the responses of MNEs during these periods of investment. We then 
offer some contributions to theory and implications for managers by suggesting that 
understanding the functioning of a political system assists firm to develop and execute 
appropriate risk management strategies.
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Resumen:
El objetivo de este artículo es identificar como el proceso histórico y los cambios en 
ideologías políticas han influenciado en la respuesta de inversión en Chile por parte de 
las empresas multinacionales. Con base en una dimensión histórica, se presenta una 
trayectoria de desarrollo a través de la cual el sistema económico chileno, influenciado por 
cambios en las ideologías políticas, ha evolucionado. En cada sección se categorizan las 
respuestas de las empresas multinacionales durante los distintos periodos de inversión. A 
continuación se proponen contribuciones a la teoría e implicancias para los administradores, 
sugiriendo que el entendimiento del funcionamiento del sistema político de un país asiste a 
la empresa para desarrollar y ejecutar estrategias de manejo de riesgo apropiadas.
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Multinacionales; inversión extranjera directa; Chile; riesgo político; responsabilidad social 
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1. Introduction
Chile, along with a number of emerging (developing) countries in Latin America has 
only relatively recently begun to acknowledge the potentially positive impacts of FDI. 
This has not always been the case. During the immediate post war period multinational 
enterprises (MNEs), principally from the United States investing in Latin America, 
displayed a voracious appetite for raw materials including copper, aluminum and oil 
to fuel the insatiable demand for US made goods. This rapid expansion created 
tension between multinationals who were bent on maximizing the well-being of their 
stakeholders, without accepting direct responsibility for the consequences of its actions 
in individual national jurisdictions and the regimes of nation states which were built on 
the principle that people within national jurisdictions had to the right to maximize their 
well- being (Hymer, 1972; Vernon, 1998).
From 1960-1985 there was an unprecedented number of expropriations and 
nationalizations of MNE investment in developing countries (Kennedy, 1992). However 
during the 1980s the pendulum against FDI in developing economies swung in the opposite 
direction. Vernon (1998) ascribes this shift to the pressures from non-government 
agencies and the role of the UN agencies in demystifying the activities of MNEs as well 
as the increasing number of bilateral, regional and global negotiations to smooth the path 
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for multinational investment. Since the 1980s MNEs have become acknowledged as the 
principal bearers of technology, capital resources and management skills with countries 
offering ‘carrots’ to MNEs in the form of financial concessions such as preferential income 
tax, tax holidays, import exemptions and import duty refunds set against exports.
The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of foreign direct investment 
in the context of Chile. Chile, of all countries in Latin America has experienced violent 
altercations in terms of policy shifts in relation to foreign direct investment – from 
colonial exploitation of resources in the 19th Century to the nationalization of its key 
resource (the copper industry which was dominated by US firms) in the 20th Century. 
This led to political intervention by the United States to support the establishment 
of a military-led coup and a shift towards a so-called neo-liberal approach to foreign 
investment (Richards, 1997). The modern perspective of foreign direct investment in 
Chile is that it is a benign force and investment in key utility industries and encouraging 
the establishment of indirect linkages with NGOs the MNCs is enabling Chile to upgrade 
its economic infrastructure. The notion of corporate social responsibility (CSR) is 
embedded in this activity (Oetzel & Doh, 2009). 
Following Redding’s (2005) approach we have based this research on English and 
Spanish commentaries of the period with original statistical data from the Central Bank of 
Chile and the United Nations Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL) the 
Chilean Economic Development Agency (CORFO). The remainder of the paper is organized 
in the following way. In the next section we examine how political risk is grounded in 
the understanding of how a political system works. We then discuss how events in the 
functioning political system may constitute managerial risk to foreign direct investors. The 
next section examines historical evidence from Chile to show how shifts in the political 
landscape resulted in attitudinal shifts towards foreign direct investment by MNEs. We 
traverse through three distinct periods of FDI in Chile, which has experienced violent 
policy shifts affecting its relationships with MNEs. In each of these phases we discuss the 
responses of MNEs during these periods of investment which we characterize as ranging 
from enclave responses (aligning with dominant political groupings) political risk insurance 
(responding to threats of expropriation) and finally an emerging trend of developing 
corporate social responsibility linkages with local entities to overcome the liabilities of 
foreignness. In the concluding section, we offer some contributions to theory and discuss 
the managerial implications of the findings.
2. Literature review
International Business, although purportedly interdisciplinary by nature, in reality exhibits 
a distinct tendency for scholars to take their primary disciplinary focus as a basis for 
analysis. International Business draws on a variety of disciplines such as economics, 
finance, management, strategy and other social sciences (Buckley & Lessard, 2005). As 
Van Wyk (2010) points out the study of risk, especially political risk, suffers from a deficit 
in interdisciplinary analysis since the political context and the forces that shape changes in 
the political context are often poorly understood by business managers.
106 Carolina SalCedo, MiChèle e. M. akoorie |Foreign Direct Investment in Chile: Historical Process, changing political ideologies and the 
responses of MNEs
Earlier studies of political risk, especially in response to the wave of nationalizations 
experienced in the post dependency era of the 1960 – 1970s focused on the sources 
of risk which originated in the institutions of host countries, home countries and the 
international environment. Robock and Simmond’s (1989) outlined the potential sources 
of risk and suggested how managers could assign risk ratings to their calculation of 
cost benefit analyses for the host country and the MNE. Scholars were still following 
this approach in the 1980s (Sethi & Luther, 1986) and the 1990s (Howell & Chaddick, 
1994). An alternative approach is to use risk rating agencies such as the Business Risk 
Intelligence SA which attempts to quantify political risk (Van Wyk, 2010). Nevertheless 
advances in the understanding of trigger points in political risk have been made with 
Bremmer and Keat (2009) suggesting that the “Fat Tail” effect may be useful in explaining 
political events that deviate from the norm. (Fat tails graphs are seen whenever there 
are a lot of events or values that stray widely from the average giving more frequent 
high and low values). 
Clearly, the understanding of political risk should be grounded in the understanding 
of how a political system works, which is the provenance of political science. Added to 
that is a need for the understanding of the sequential flow of risk; that is how events 
in the functioning political system are expressed and developed through informal and 
formal agendas which is the legitimate authority of a government.
Almond and Powell (1966) distinguish three levels on which the political system 
functions. For the first level Easton (1965) classified two classes of inputs into the 
political system; demands and supports. Demands may be for goods and services 
such as health care; product regulation (safety standards); participation (changes in 
government policy such as in the field of discrimination policy) and commitments to 
values (such as recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights). Each of these inputs may 
come from different sources such as elites inside the political system, boundary-
crossing activities of societal organizations such as non-government organizations 
(NGOs) and international non-government organizations (IGOs) such as climate 
change advocacy groups. To convert each of these inputs into outputs requires the 
allocation of public funds and participation. In meeting different input requirements 
governments may have to undertake a balancing act to meet demands of different 
constituent groups and at the same time fulfill economic and social agendas. To 
convert policy proposals into binding rules is the function of government rule makers 
such as elected representatives or ministerial agencies. The adjudication of rules is 
carried out by the judicial system. 
The second level of functioning is how the political system interacts with its 
environment. This environment is flexible and may expand or contract as levels of 
political participation shift (Van Wyk, 2010). Almond and Powell (1966) identify four 
categories of system capabilities. Extractive capabilities refer to the system’s ability to 
draw in material and human resources (such as taxes and via immigration policies) into its 
environment. The regulative capability refers to control over individual or organizational 
activities. The distributive capability refers to how goods and services, opportunities 
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and recognition are offered to individuals and organization. The fourth system capability 
is symbolic – where a political system affirms the values of society through ceremonial 
occasions. The success of a legitimate political system is measured by the extent of its 
ability to respond to constituents by converting demands into appropriate policies. A 
coalition of minority parties may lead to considerable compromise in meeting competing 
by legitimate demands.
Of all aspects of a political system, environmental adaption represents a latent form of 
political risk. In a democracy, elections fulfill the primary function of recruiting individuals 
to perform the roles of maintenance of the status quo or adapting (and being socialized) 
into an incoming regime. Non democratic systems may employ less transparent forms 
of appointment such as cooptation, or cronyism. Where there is a political shift taking 
place in a society there may be fragmentation and conflict, especially where there is 
a political group which may be small in numeric terms but is more vocal in influencing 
policy. Identifications of ethnicity and religious grouping may supersede national activity. 
Where the political system is dysfunctional rule-makers may respond in different ways; 
either adapting their behavior to accommodate demands; suppress demands; deny or 
display indifference to demands. Grindle and Thomas (1991) and Jones (2001) suggest 
that a distinction may be made between public and formal agendas. Where there is a 
public agenda issues have been given a high level of public interest and visibility. As the 
Chilean example in this paper shows, during the 1960’s Salvador Allende was able to 
engage the public in the intellectual dependencia debate which claimed that developing 
country resources were exploited by foreign investors. However this move to a public 
agenda can be preceded by a formal agenda in which decision makers consider agendas 
which have not yet been made public. To mobilize these agendas initiatives by outside 
interest groups (or expert decision makers) gives credence to decision makers to move 
their demands from the formal to the public agenda. If demands are initiated by political 
elites then the expansion to the public agenda is not required since these elites take their 
own responsibility for decision making and can empower resources such as the military or 
para-military forces.
While the dissection of a country’s political system may offer potential investors some 
indicators about how shifts in the landscape could impact on their business activities it 
does not provide a guide to how managers might develop a framework for assessing risk. 
Business continuity planning focuses on multiple drivers of threats and vulnerabilities; the 
impact of such threats in the form of risk exposure of the firm and managerial policies 
to mitigate risk such as awareness, creation, prevention, remediation and knowledge 
management. 
 Van Wyk (2010) offers a sequential flow of risk model which is linked to the 
various processes and functions of the political system. Over time the model shows 
how political risk moves from conditions to politicized events, then to threats, risks 
and the management of these risks. Simon (1984) suggests that risks typically emerge 
from conditions inside the political system or its embedded context. It can also 
emanate from external environments or systems such as the transnational activities of 
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organizations such as firms, NGOs, IGOs and governments. Conditions are transformed 
into events where demands originate within the political system; for example a change 
of government (political authority) committed to nationalization of foreign owned 
assets, as was the case in Chile in the Allende regime in the 1960s, increased the risk 
perception of current foreign investors. 
Simons (2000) distinguishes between four types of risk: operations risk and distributive 
capability, asset impairment risk, competitive risk, and franchise and reputational risk. 
Of all the risks the most high profile risk is related to a firm’s distributive capability. A 
firm’s distributive capability can be threatened by nationalization (with compensation) or 
confiscation or expropriation of assets (without compensation). This is often driven by 
interest groups who shape the formal agenda on business, trade and competition. Firms 
are limited in their powers of redress in this situation since the interests of foreign firms 
would not be supported by politicized local courts. 
Risk management policy options that are available to firms can be categorized into 
three main approaches (Burmester & Tayeb, 2000; Hilber & Jones, 2004; Lhabitant & 
Tinguela, 2001). The first policy approach is market avoidance (or postponement of market 
entry) until industry or market uncertainties improve. However this approach presupposes 
that the firm’s information system and decision making regarding international operations 
(understanding of politics, knowledge management and strategy) is adequate to perform 
such a task. 
The second policy approach is an exit strategy. This may be the only way in which 
a firm can recover from catastrophic and reputation damaging events. Such was the 
strategy adopted by Nestle in the Infant Food formula debacle in Africa in the 1970s 
(Sethi, 1994). 
A third policy option is risk sharing through long term agreements with buyers and 
suppliers, alliances and international joint ventures (Allaire & Firsirotu, 1989; Shapiro, 
1986). Such risk sharing activities may be mandated by governments, as is the case with 
the Chinese automobile industry where, as a pillar industry, foreign investment is limited 
to 50 per cent of the investment to encourage the transfer of technological, management 
and organizational skills. The advantage to the international joint venture partner is to 
have partners who can navigate their way through the complex web of the local official 
approvals and industry regulations. However although these arrangements of uncertainty 
trade-offs may mitigate risk through sharing interests divergent interests may be created 
through change in political authorities or regimes (Miller, 1992).
In conclusion then, the concept of political risk needs to be grounded in an 
understanding of how a political system in a given country works and how the political 
system as a whole interacts with its environment and how that environment is 
maintained and adapted. Adaptation refers to political shifts which might be taking 
place in an environment. These political shifts may be fragmented and conflictual, if 
there is one group which is attempting to assert influence over formal agendas and this 
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influence is being resisted by the incumbent elite. For a foreign investor the shifts in 
political agenda setting lead to politicized events, then potentially threats to investment 
and then risks. How a firm identifies these risks (whether it is operations risk, asset 
impairment risk, competitive risk or franchise and reputational risk) will determine an 
appropriate policy response. 
As the next section of this paper shows historical evidence of foreign direct 
investment in Chile has had to contend with shifting ideologies, expressed as politicized 
events which have threatened the distributive capability of investors. The history of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in Chile also shows how two companies, both in the 
same industry, responded to these events and their assessment of managerial risk 
was exceptionally polarized.
2.1. Historical Importance Of FDI in Chile
The figure below (Table 1) offers an historical explanation of FDI in Chile highlighting 
the dominant ideologies, the characteristics of FDI and the responses of MNC to key 
political events. 
The earliest foreign investment in Chile was in 1822, four years after the 
declaration of its independence from Spain. Since then, three main periods can be 
distinguished (Behrens, 1992): These periods are shown in Table 1. The prevailing 
political ideology in each period is shown in the middle column which helps explain 
the radical shifts in policy towards FDI in each period identified.
Working from Table 1 we now examine in more detail the historical process of 
FDI in Chile. Each section is presented in four parts. First, we briefly discuss the key 
political events of each period, followed by a discussion of the dominant political 
ideologies of the time; the characteristics of FDI in each period and the responses of 
MNCs to shifts in the political landscape.
2.2 British Investment Predominance (1822-1918)
In the first half of the nineteenth century, the Chilean situation seemed exceptional 
among the Spanish colonies (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979). Chile already had reasonably 
stable institutions, and the Chilean port of Valparaiso was well situated, considering 
the reorganization of Latin American relations with metropolitan markets. Chile’s 
numerous exports included copper, agricultural products and livestock, for which 
there were favorable prospects on the world market. 
Most foreign investment, mainly British, entered the marketing and inter-oceanic 
transport sector (Behrens, 1992) Local investment continued to be limited to the 
primary activities, which meant that production was controlled nationally while 
marketing and transportation were controlled from abroad. This pattern changed with 
the flow of foreign investment into the extractive industries. 
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2.3. Dominant Political Characteristics of the nclave Economy3
Cardoso and Faletto (1979) noted that the reason for a division of functions between locals 
and foreigners was that foreign investment in these sectors increased the income of the 
local landowners by expanding production. They argue that local capital was available 
for the investments made by foreigners, but owners of this capital were not interested 
in investing in such activities. However, the expansion of the economy created demand 
for large capital investments, especially in mining and the railway business, as well as 
increasingly complex transportation and marketing services. This expansion required a 
volume of investment beyond the possibilities of local private capital (Cardoso & Faletto, 
1979). As a result, Chile could not keep foreign interests from gaining control of national 
production sectors. Indeed, between 1822 and 1830, British investors started to enter 
the railway business and the mining sector. For instance, three British mining firms were 
established in the 1820s. 
In the years following 1850, Chile entered a period of greater prosperity. The economic 
order was better integrated with the metropolitan powers. The new market stimulated Chile 
to develop an industrial economy; Chilean copper was an excellent example (Behrens, 1992). 
Within this context, enclave investments were embedded in the Chilean economy (between 
the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century), when national 
political groups already had power and controlled important economic sectors. 
2.4. The Structure of Domination 
The structure of domination was a direct manifestation of the political subordination of the 
workers and peasant sectors to the dominant classes. The national dominant groups were 
linked to foreign firms more as a politically dominant class than as an “entrepreneurial 
sector” (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979). During this period (the nineteenth century) British 
investment continued to dominate investment in the Chilean economy, as demonstrated 
by its involvement in a range of sectors, specially the food industry, textiles, printing, and 
metals (Muñoz, 1977), and by the development of the exports sector. 
After the “Guerra del Pacifico”4, the Chilean economy changed dramatically since the 
country gained land rich in nitrate (Chilean nitrate). The importance of nitrate for the Chilean 
economy vastly exceeded the importance of copper. Consequently, in 1890, the value of 
Chilean exports was 17 per cent higher than in 1879. In the same year the involvement of 
British investors in export activities was a considerable 56 per cent, which finally reached 
74 per cent in 1895 (Behrens, 1992). This boom was mainly the result of British investors 
becoming the owners of the major part of the nitrate industry. 
3 In enclave economies, foreign invested capital originates in the exterior, is incorporated into local productive 
processes and transforms parts of itself into wages and taxes. Its value is increased by the exploitation of local labor 
forces, which transform nature and produce goods that realize the life of this capital when staples are sold in the 
external market, In the case of copper mining in Chile, foreign firms assumed control of firms that have been created 
and expanded by local entrepreneurs (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979, p.19)
4 This war (1879-1883) was between Peru, Bolivia and Chile. Chile won the war.
114 Carolina SalCedo, MiChèle e. M. akoorie |Foreign Direct Investment in Chile: Historical Process, changing political ideologies and the 
responses of MNEs
In the following years, until World War I (WWI), British investment continued to increase. 
However, FDI coming from the United States and Germany started to grow as well. As a result, by 
1919 its relative importance for the Chilean economy relative to other investors started to decline. 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century German investors controlled 18 per cent of the nitrate 
sector and trade activities between Chile and the United States showed a rapid increase – mainly 
directed to the mining sector especially copper (Behrens, 1992). Thus, until 1915 the main foreign 
investors in Chile came from England, the United States and Germany, representing 52 per cent, 
34 per cent, and 13 per cent of total investment respectively (Behrens, 1992). 
2.5. United States’ Investment Predominance (1919-1973)
Despite “enclave” features, during the first quarter of the twentieth century the Chilean 
economy was characterized by a relatively successful and commercialized nineteenth 
century agricultural base, coupled with a locally-controlled “small-mining” sector, which 
supported quite high levels of pre-industrial modernization (Kaufman, 1979). Most of the 
mining and agricultural products were exported to Europe. As a result, the external market 
played a crucial role in the economic development of Chile (Behrens, 1992). 
After 1884, the nitrate economy, in the hands of British capital, continued to be the 
major source of revenue, and exports increased notably during World War I. United States 
capital began to displace British capital at this time. One technological reason was that 
the Guggenheim system of nitrate exploitation made possible the use of lower-grade 
limestone than did the British Shank system. United States banks supplanted the British 
Rothschild’s bank as creditors of the State (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979). 
However, although conditions for the change in foreign trade were favorable, the 
post-war years were a period of bond issues, inflation, and unconvertible paper currency. 
Speculation and negotiations with the State were everyday events. With the end of WWI 
the situation became worse since Chilean nitrate was less in demand and was also being 
replaced by synthetic nitrate. Nitrate revenues fell 36 per cent from 1918 to 1922 (Cardoso 
and Faletto, 1979). In this period of recession and stagnation of FDI in Chile, the United 
States maintained its position as the main source of capital. As a result, after World War 
I, the United States positioned itself as Chile’s main source of FDI. The importance of FDI 
inflows coming from the United States showed a rapid increase. In 1926 it represented 50 
per cent of total FDI and in 1930 it rose to 70 cent (Ramírez, 1970).
The world crisis of 1929-1930 affected the enclave economy and the economy as a whole. 
In 1930, exports decreased 42 per cent from 1929, and until 1955 (in nominal value) were 
still less than in 1929 (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979). In terms of inflows of foreign investment, the 
crisis represented a considerable breakdown for the Chilean economy. Table 2 shows that FDI 
reached its highest point in 1936, thereafter decreasing until 1943. The decrease in FDI inflows 
was a result of the worldwide recession which slowed down overseas investment from OECD 
countries. Decreasing FDI inflows in certain periods were a result of remittances of capital and 
the acquisition of foreign-owned firms, mainly British, by local investors (Behrens, 1992). The 
inflows of FDI started to rise again only in the mid-1940s. Their recovery, in 1944, could be 
attributed to the worldwide resurgence of FDI in the mid-1940s. 
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After the 1929 crisis, employment could be maintained only by State subsidies. With 
Chilean nitrate being replaced by synthetic nitrate on the world market, foreign firms began 
to dismantle their plants. If balance were to be restored, a new economic structure had 
to be created to sustain it. During this period, the government took measures to expand, 
or in some cases to create an industrial sector. In addition to the repercussions of the 
“Great Depression” in the economy, the limited availability of finished products during the 
period of World War II (WWII) also played an important role in the shift from an “outward-
growth model” to an “import substitution” type of development, which was characterized 
by industrialization and the formation of a local market. The import-substitution strategy 
was supposed to assist Chile to abandon its economic reliance on the production of 
primary products and become an economy “on its way to industrialization” (”en vias de 
industrializacion”), in terms of economic growth and industry structure (Behrens, 1992; 
Cardoso & Faletto, 1979). The dominant social groups allied themselves and worked 
together after the Great Depression to impose their own system of domination and to 
organize production (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979; Quijano, 1974). 
Table 2. FDI inflows: 1925-1952 (in nominal US millions dollars)
1925 535
1929 649
1930 646
1931 786
1932 702
1933 761
1934 824
1935 828
1936 841
1939 729
1943 442
1944 470
1948 617
1952 733
1954-57 338
1958-61 985
1962-65 779
1966-69 1375
1970-73 62
Source: Behrens (1992)
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3. The Rise ff Nationalist Sentiment
Economic factors, political ideologies and the importance given to the development of 
local industry resulted in the emergence of a nationalist sentiment in Chile, which resulted 
in the adoption of policies that encouraged State intervention (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979). 
Within this process, in 1939, the Corporacion de Fomento de la Produccion (CORFO)5 was 
created. Its main role was to establish and maintain an economic policy in which the State 
would also play an entrepreneurial role. 
Between 1940 and 1970, CORFO invested in a range of activities. Two periods of 
development can be distinguished (Behrens, 1992). The first, from 1940 until the mid-
1950s, was characterized by the focus on the substitution of imports. During this period 
important State firms were created: ENDESA (Empresa Nacional de Electricidad S.A.), in 
the energy industry; CAP (Compañia de Aceros del Pacifico) in the steel industry; ENAP 
(Empresa Nacional del Petroleo) in the exploitation and refining of oil; and IANSA (Industria 
Azucarera Nacional S.A.), in the sugar beet industry. The second period, from the end 
of the 1950s until 1970, focused on exports diversification, by developing the forestry, 
fishing, and fruit sectors. In this structure of national production the importance of the 
State grew, both as a supplier and as a consumer of products. 
Changes in FDI regulations during the administration of President Carlos Ibáñez del 
Campo (1954-1958) resulted in a significant increase in manufacturing investments, 
although mining continued to be the main attraction for foreign firms. Specifically, 
in 1954, the first Foreign Investment Statute, which promulgated a positive attitude 
towards FDI, was established. Until 1969 this positive attitude increasingly attracted 
inflows of FDI. 
Between 1959 and 1970, capital inflows were concentrated in the mining sector, 
manufacturing6, and to a much smaller extent, in services. During this period, United 
States and Canadian firms accounted for the bulk of foreign inflows (ECLAC, 2000). 
At the end of the 1960s Chile had one of the biggest stocks of foreign investment in 
relation to its GDP in comparison with the rest of the world, mainly because of the 
huge investments made by Anaconda and Kennecott in the copper mining industry 
(Desormeaux, 1993).
3.1. Dependencia critique of developmentalism 
In Latin America, during the late 1960s, the question of FDI in manufacturing was one 
of the major issues which led to the dependency critique of Economic Commission for 
Latin America (ECLA) developmentalism in Latin America (Jenkins, 1984). It saw MNEs 
as a major mechanism blocking development in developing countries and as an important 
obstacle to socialist transformation. 
5 Corporation for the promotion of production.
6 Mainly the manufacture of paper and petroleum-based chemicals.
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The dependency approach criticized the developmentalist assumptions about FDI’s 
contributions in terms of additional foreign exchange, additional savings, and better technology, 
and management techniques. FDI was linked to underdevelopment (Jenkins, 1987). 
Dependency writers also noticed other consequences of FDI. They argued that FDI 
concentrates on the production of luxury products for small elites instead of supplying 
basic goods for the mass of the population. Also, MNEs are not integrated in the local 
industry since they tend to generate links primarily with the parent firm or other affiliates 
and only to a very limited extent with local suppliers. Moreover, MNEs tend to use their 
political influence in order that public expenditure is allocated to support their investment 
through the provision of infrastructure (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979; Jenkins, 1987). 
In the late 1960s Chile’s economic scenery was substantially altered by a series of 
reforms, particularly the nationalization of large-scale copper mining7 and agrarian reform 
(Cardoso & Faletto, 1979; Behrens, 1992; ECLAC, 2000). Some economists and reformist 
politicians argued that redistributive policies which enlarged the local market would 
provide a new impetus to manufacturing growth, primarily in non-durable consumer goods 
and in some low-price consumer durables sectors. This strategy was one component of 
the general policies of the Frei and Allende’s administrations. It implied, for one thing, tax 
and land reforms which antagonized not only traditional elites, but much of the urban 
middle class (Kaufman, 1979). Of these, only Frei’s comparatively moderate version was 
able to manage conflicting pressures for a short period of time. Between 1965 and 1967, 
income and land redistribution, rising copper revenues, massive Alliance for Progress 
aid, and some direct foreign investment, all combined to stimulate a three-year period of 
industrial expansion. By 1968, however, prices started to rise and the economy slowed 
again. Moreover, foreign manufacturing investment also dropped off sharply after 1968, 
apparently in response to the growing local conflict and the forthcoming 1970 presidential 
elections (Kaufman, 1979). 
The late 1960s and early 1970s were marked by a growth of the left in Latin America 
and a number of popular victories. As an ideology, developmentalism was discredited for 
large sectors of the population by the late 1960s. In Chile, the regime of president Salvador 
Allende instituted policies to control MNEs very strictly, a strategy which also appealed 
strongly to nationalism for legitimacy (Jenkins, 1984). Indeed, in 1970, Chile signed the 
Andean pact, which established a range of measures and policies that considerably 
restricted foreign activity, in this way stopping the flow of FDI to Chile. 
Consequently, with the advent of the socialist government of President Salvador 
Allende, the State became more deeply involved in the economy, and the scope of action 
for private agents narrowed. In addition to carrying out land reform and initiating a new 
policy of income redistribution, the Allende government nationalized foreign firms, from 
the mines to the banks (Ianni, 1975).
7 For an illustration of the effects of the “nationalization” of the mining sector in Chile see the cases of Kennecott 
and Anaconda in Shapiro, 1986.
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Under the Popular Unity8 government, Chile’s foreign policy was that of a socialist State. 
Chilean foreign policy attempted to discard assumptions or practices that contradicted 
the interests of the wage-earning classes. Foreign policy adopted the viewpoint of these 
classes, not that of the bourgeoisie9 (Ianni, 1975; Quijano, 1974). It has been argued that 
in Chile a national bourgeoisie was able to develop industry in the period before WWII 
because, among other factors, foreign capital was mainly interested in the primary sector. 
On the other hand, extensive sectors of industry were controlled by foreign capital even in 
the inter-war period and that there was no justification for the view that local industrialists 
constituted a class opposed to foreign capital and imperialism10 (Kaufman, 1979). 
4. Shifts in the Political Landscape
Allende’s hostile position towards MNEs prompted extreme reactions from local sectors11 
and international economic powers, particularly from the United States. In February 1972 
President Nixon made official the governmental policy proposed by ITT in October 1970 
following Allende’s victory in the Chilean elections. One of the conglomerate’s proposals 
was for systemization of United States pressures against Chile. Subsequently, without 
informing President Allende, all United States aid funds already committed to Chile were 
given the “under review” status so that entry of money into Chile was temporarily stopped 
with a view to a permanent cut-off if necessary (Ianni, 1975) 12. 
Consequently, within a relatively short period of time the country suffered from a 
severe political and economic crisis and, as conditions for foreign capital were found to 
be discouraging, a sharp fall in FDI inflows resulted. The stock of FDI decreased towards 
the end of 1973 to US$500 million, one of the lowest in Latin America (Desormeaux, 
1993). 
4.1. Responses of Multinationals to crisis – political risk
Shapiro’s (1986) classic case study of two U.S copper MNEs involvement in Chile 
illustrates how political risk can be managed ex ante through a policy of multilateral 
entrapment. As Table 1 shows Kennecott and Anaconda had radically different outlooks 
8 The Popular Unity is a coalition of predominantly leftist parties that form the political base of the government.
9 Indeed, it has been argued that the local industrial bourgeoisie in the region was not opposed to foreign capital. 
Surveys of industrialists in Chile confirmed this, finding that far from being opposed to foreign capital, they were 
generally in favor of foreign investment (Kaufman, 1979).
10 Writings on “dependent development” have emphasized the interdependent relationship between the local 
bourgeoisie and international capital. While local capital may depend on foreign capital for technology, trademarks, 
access to export markets, and so on, MNEs may depend on the local bourgeoisie to play an integrative role because 
of their greater involvement in local networks through personal and family ties (Jenkins, 1984).
11 For the local bourgeoisie and military officers and technocrats, who were not tied directly to contending class 
interests, political-economic patterns seemed to support the view that the costs of tolerating populist pressures 
had increased – a perspective which undoubtedly grew and hardened among MNEs in the course of the 1950s and 
1960s (Kaufman, 1979).
12 Documentos Secretos de la ITT, quotation p. 81 in Ianni (1974).
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on Chile’s future. Kennecott was concerned to minimize its exposure in Chile through 
developing a multinational web of stakeholders while Anaconda remained bullish on 
Chile all along. Kennecott was under pressure to expand and modernize its mining 
operation at El Tienente but the expansion plan was financed by the sale of a 51 per 
cent interest in the mine for US$80 million to the Chilean government in exchange for a 
10 year management contract. 
Kennecott also insured its equity sale to the Chilean government with US-AID and 
ensured that further financing (obtained from the U.S. Export-Import Bank – Eximbank) 
loan was unconditionally guaranteed by the Chilean state. Kennecott also ensured that 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity was voided by insisting that any disputes between 
Kennecott and Chile would be submitted to the law of the State of New York. The web 
of entrapment was further spun by mortgaging copper still in the ground by writing long 
term contracts to European and Asian customers and selling the collection rights for these 
contracts to a consortium of European banks and Mitsui and Co., the Japanese trading 
company (Shapiro, 1986, p.490).
By contrast Anaconda, which had invested heavily in its own name in new mines and 
the modernization of existing ones throughout 1945-1965, refused voluntary divestiture 
and was forced to sell its Chilean holdings to the state in 1969. Anaconda had partial cover 
for its holdings with AID prior to its forced divesture but had allowed the policy to lapse. 
Anaconda was expropriated without compensation because it had no leverage (being the 
sole investor) against the Chilean government and it had no coverage from OPIC since it 
had failed to insure against political risk. Kennecott raised the cost of nationalization to the 
host government while Anaconda ignored it. 
4.2. The 1973 coup coalition 
The crisis was so intense, the economic disturbance so severe, that on September 11 
1973, a coup coalition – formed by civilian and military technocrats with the support of 
international agents (Ianni, 1975) – put an end to Salvador Allende’s government through 
the institution of a Bureaucratic Authoritarian (B-A)13 rule (Jenkins, 1984) headed by 
Augusto Pinochet. 
The change of regime brought about different policies in the economic arena, which 
resulted in a change of the extent and pattern of FDI for the following years. The politico-
economic crisis during the Popular Unity, the nationalization (without compensation) of 
the copper industry, and the post-coup repression were so violent that for a substantial 
period the government had difficulty in attracting foreign investment in spite of extreme 
economic orthodoxy (Collier, 1979).
13 This system is “excluding” and nondemocratic. Central actors in the dominant coalition include high-level 
technocrats – military and civilian, within and outside the State- working in close association with foreign capital. 
This new elite eliminates electoral competition and severely controls the political participation of the popular sector. 
Public policy is centrally concerned with promoting advanced industrialization (Collier, 1979).
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4.3. Extreme Economic Orthodoxy
The military government, which took power in 1973, called upon several internationally 
respected technocrats to frame policies that made radical changes in economic policy 
with the introduction of a neo-liberal model (ECLAC, 2000). Cardoso and Faletto (1979) 
refer to this approach as a “peculiar kind of liberal economy”, in the sense that the State 
redistributed wealth to those groups of private interests that economically controlled 
the regime. Kaufman (1979) described this approach as unusual, in terms of the extent 
to which the military government embraced the tenets of conservative economic 
orthodoxy. The ideological influence to which policy makers were primarily responding 
was anti-planning, anti-import substitution industrialization (ISI) and anti-ECLA reaction 
(Hirschman, 1979). The most absolutist component of this movement was a group of Latin 
American economists, who had received graduate training at the University of Chicago, 
in whose Department of Economics strict neo-laissez-faire views had long been dominant 
(Desormeaux, 1993).
Policy makers imported virtually without reservation strict monetarist and laissez-faire 
doctrines, apparently convinced that exceptional measures were essential to control the 
desperate inflationary and balance of payments crises and to restore the confidence of 
international lenders and investors. Import, price and distribution controls, installed under 
previous administrations, were removed; wages were frozen; and credit was severely 
restricted. Also, much of the “State enterprise” sector was dismantled (Cardoso & Faletto, 
1979; ECLAC, 2000; Kaufman, 1979). 
The B-A regime implemented a range of measures to attract FDI. It was committed 
to provide information to foreign investors through an “open-discussion behind closed 
doors” policy, in which it would openly discuss the Chilean reality with foreign investors 
(Bitar, Espinosa, Maulian, Vergara, & Vignolo, 1980). Furthermore, those in power14 simply 
accepted local and eventually international private interests as if they corresponded to 
the needs of the nation and of the people. Between 1973 and 1977, over three hundred 
firms nationalized by Allende were returned to their former owners; another two hundred 
State firms, many of which had originated in the public sector, were sold into private 
hands (ECLAC, 2000). In addition, in order to reinstate MNEs’ confidence, the military 
government refused to adhere to Andean Pact restrictions on MNEs and, in 1976, Chile 
withdrew from the Andean Pact itself (Kaufman, 1979). To promote copper sales, the 
junta negotiated a settlement with the expropriated American mining firms, in exchange 
for promises of marketing assistance for new investment in copper-refining industries 
(ECLAC, 2000; Kaufman, 1979). 
In 1974, the government enacted a new Foreign Investment Statute, the Decree Law 
600 (DL 600), regulating the conditions of market entry, capitalization and remittances of 
foreign capital. This legal instrument was used to raise the profile of foreign investment, 
and it soon became one of the main sources of financing for a renewed development 
14 Technocrats, both military and civilians, and the bourgeoisie (economic elite).
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strategy based on an extensive opening of the economy (ECLAC, 2000; Bitar et al., 1980). 
From 1974, the vast majority of foreign investors have chosen to use this mechanism (DL 
600). Between 1974 and 2003, investments representing 83 per cent of total FDI inflows 
used this mechanism (Foreign Investment Committee, 2004). The popularity of the DL 
600 with investors stems not only from the fiscal advantages it offers but also from the 
long-term security, which it provides (Ffrench-Davis, 2003). However, the DL 600 was not 
always the preferred investment mechanism. 
4.4 Responses of MNEs
With these measures, the new government sought to turn the market into the main 
agent of resource allocation, private enterprise into the driving force of the economy, and 
comparative advantage-based exports into the foundation for the country’s economic 
development (Behrens, 1992; ECLAC, 2000). The main focus of the government’s long-
term strategy of recovery was the expansion and diversification of exports. Export 
diversification was portrayed as a fundamental departure from Chile’s long-standing 
dependence on industrial protectionism and mineral exports. Commitment to the 
promotion of non-traditional exports was reflected by, among other things, the formation 
of a new agency, ProChile, charged with developing foreign markets for Chilean wines, 
fruits, shoes, textiles, leather products, and paper (Kaufman, 1979). 
For the first three or four years of military rule, the impact of these policies seemed at 
best ineffective and at worst counterproductive (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979; ECLAC, 2000; 
Kaufman, 1979). It was expected that FDI would help to strengthen and broaden the 
Chilean export sector. Indeed, FDI inflows for the period 1974-1977 were not significant 
(Behrens, 1992; Desormeaux, 1993; ECLAC, 2000). However, although European creditors 
refused in 1975 to refinance Chile’s large external debt, private American banks and the 
World Bank began in the mid-1970s to provide a substantial inflow of financial aid and 
credit. As a result, in 1976 the economy started to show scattered signs of recovery, and 
by 1977 these began to provide some basis for official optimism. For the period 1977-1979, 
Chile had a balance of payments surplus; its inflation rate had come down to about 60 
per cent and its economy continued the modest recovery begun in 1976 (Kaufman, 1979). 
FDI inflows increased considerably in the late 1970s (see Table 3). However, this trend 
slowed at the beginning of the 1980s due to an economic recession in Chile. A strong 
external shock, generated by a sudden break in foreign financing, rising international 
interest rates and deterioration in the terms of trade intensified by heavy local borrowing 
and an inflexible economic policy, caused GDP to decrease by 14 per cent in 1982. In 
response, the government adopted a more realistic economic policy, particularly regarding 
foreign exchange rate policies (Behrens, 1992; ECLAC, 2000; Kaufman, 1979). 
As one of the solutions to the 1980s debt crisis, and as a way to increase inflows of 
FDI, Chapter XIX, a mechanism for converting debt into equity was created (See Table 4). 
This mechanism consisted of foreign investors buying debt documents – their market value 
was significantly lower than their nominal value – and using them as capital for investing 
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in Chile. The debt-conversion program was promoted widely abroad, which helped to 
create a favorable climate for foreign investors and encouraged them to consider Chile 
as an investment prospect (ECLAC, 2000). Indeed, a number of non-traditional investors 
were attracted by this mechanism, for example, investors from Holland and New Zealand 
(Behrens, 1992).
Chapter XIX was discriminatory in terms of access to productive activities. For instance, 
only 10 per cent of investments in the mining sector were allowed to use this mechanism 
(Riveros & Vatter, 1994). However, Chapter XIX made it possible to finance major projects in 
the promising resource-based manufacturing industry, particularly the forestry sector. These 
investments – like those made in agricultural activities, mainly fresh fruit, and fisheries – 
boosted Chilean exports (ECLAC, 2000). Services activities also received a large share of the 
resources that flowed into the country under Chapter XIX, particularly telecommunications, 
electrical energy, banking, pension fund administrators, and tourism.
Table 3. Realized FDI Inflows by Investment Mechanism 1974-1987  
(Millions of US dollars, annual averages) 
Period DL 600 + Chapter XIV Chapter XIX Total
1974-77 18.1 - 18.1
1978-82 364.2 - 364.2
1983-87 184.4 178 362.3
Source: Muñoz (2003)
Table 4. Realized FDI Inflows by Investment Mechanism 1985-2004  
(in nominal US millions dollars)
Period DL 600 Chapter XIV Chapter XIX Total
1985 167 6 - 205
1986 261 7 32 482
1987 541 14 214 1,262
1988 844 18 707 1,748
1989 981 16 886 2,318
1990 1,280 35 1,321 1,733
1991 982 98 418 1,102
1992 995 158 22 1,153
1993 1,736 204 - 1,940
(continued)
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Period DL 600 Chapter XIV Chapter XIX Total
1994 2,522 410 - 2,932
1995 3,031 410 - 3,441
1996 4,838 442 - 5,280
1997 5,225 921 - 6,146
1998 6,039 539 - 6,578
1999 9,186 689 - 9,875
2000 3,039 1,931 - 4,970
2001 5,017 1,037 - 6,054
2002 3,381 1,654 - 5,035
2003 1,286 1,334 - 2,620
2004 5,004 2,144 - 7,148
Source: Foreign Investment Committee (Chile) (2004)
During the second half of the 1980s FDI inflows increased as a result of inflows of FDI 
coming through Chapter XIX coupled with a positive investment environment (Desormeaux, 
1993). At the same time, FDI inflows channeled through the traditional mechanism of DL 600 
also increased, with most of these going to new mining projects (ECLAC, 2000). However, 
in 1990 this figure decreased again as a result of a considerable drop in FDI coming through 
Chapter XIX. When the market value of the debt documents started to match their nominal 
value, which occurred in 1991, Chapter XIX lost its importance since it was more expensive 
to use this mechanism than the DL 600 in terms of capital repatriation and profits remittance. 
For instance, Chapter XIX established that investors could repatriate capital only 10 years 
after their entry and remit profits only 5 years after their entry (Wilska, 2002). As a result, 
total FDI inflows decreased between 1990 and 1992. 
5. Resurgence of a Democratic Regime
The beginning of the 1990s was a key period for the Chilean society. First, the resurgence of 
a democratic regime took place through a peaceful and organized process, which brought 
about the reintegration of Chile into the international arena. Second, it represented the 
beginning of the most productive period of the Chilean economy, which continued until 
the consequences of the Asian crisis reached Latin America. In the 1990s the effects 
of the debt crisis disappeared and the new government was successful in reconciling 
macroeconomic and social objectives by promulgating appropriate policies (Ffrench-Davis 
& Tapia, 2001). 
Table 4. Realized FDI Inflows by Investment Mechanism 1985-2004  
(in nominal US millions dollars). (continued)
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The Chilean environment of the 1990s attracted considerable amounts of FDI. 
Between 1991 and 1999 inflows of FDI increased steadily reaching their highest point in 
1999, despite the disappearance of the Chapter XIX mechanism. This phenomenon was 
due not only to the positive economic environment of Chile, but was also part of a global 
trend. However, in Latin America, Chile has been one of the most preferred locations for 
FDI. Chile has offered a dynamic and strong economy relative to other Latin American 
countries, something which constituted a crucial factor for attracting FDI in the 1990s, 
despite its small local market. Most FDI entering the Chilean economy during this decade 
was directed to mergers and acquisitions (M&A) of successful Chilean firms (Muñoz, 
2003). Towards the end of the decade, large-scale flows of FDI into services activities 
began to shape a new pattern in the involvement of MNEs in the Chilean economy (ECLAC, 
2000).
5.1. Since the 1990s – the rise of neo-structuralism (CEPAL)
The triumph of neo-liberalism began during at the beginning of the 1980s. The programs 
for adjustment and the financial support of the World Bank and IMF were bound up with 
the adoption of neo-liberal policies in the countries which requested financial assistance. 
The classical structuralist theorists were forced to rethink and to modify their defensive 
position. Since the middle of the 1980s a concept for development has emerged that builds 
on classical structuralist assumptions and sees itself as an antithesis to neo-liberalism: 
neo-structuralism. The variety of political and economic positions within Latin America 
explains the fact that the CEPAL was not able to present its new concept earlier during 
the times of the obvious failure of Cepalismo and the debt crisis. A consensus could not 
be found. Only when neo-liberalism was generally accepted as the predominant economic 
practice the CEPAL could set up a new system based on neo-liberal fundamentals (CEPAL, 
2001). 
5.2. The new Cepalismo: Neo-structuralism or simply a repetition of 
neo-liberalism?
The new CEPAL-strategy for development in the 1990s suggests that neither the 
industrialization in the framework of the local market of the post-war period nor the 
neo-liberal opening towards world market in the 1980s has provided a long-term 
productive model for development. Neo-structuralism is based on the CEPAL-concept 
of “Transformación productiva con equidad” (changing production patterns with social 
equity). It is a reorientation in development theory, as for the first time it to forge a better 
union between economic growth, equity and democracy (Riveros & Vatter, 1994). The 
CEPAL, traditionally antagonistic to neo-liberalism has now had to reformulate its ideas 
in a way that was compatible with the neo-liberal approach, so that these ideas could 
be accepted in the new age of neo-liberal paradigm. Thus, there remains a question of 
interpretation. Can neo-structuralism be seen as the opposite of neo-liberalism or is it 
only a further development of neo-liberalism? The new program “changing production 
patterns with social equity” tries to take advantage of all possibilities within the neo-liberal 
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approach that are offered for an international competitive and efficient economy but, at 
the same time, allows for the existence of democratic structures and promotes pollution 
control and social adjustment. 
5.3. Responses of MNEs – new landscapes to explore
In the first half of the 1990s, a considerable amount of FDI inflows was directed to 
sectors associated with the exploitation of natural resources, especially in the mining 
sector, which absorbed 57 per cent of FDI inflows via DL 600 in 1990-95 (Foreign 
Investment Committee, 2004, 2005). Since 1990, however, other sectors have gained in 
importance. Consequently, the mining sector represented 22 cent of GDP for the period 
1996-2001. The service sector became the most attractive sector, representing 26 per 
cent of GDP in 1996-2001 without including the electricity, gas, and water industries. A 
considerable amount of the inflows was directed to the banking industry; in fact, foreign 
banks increased their participation in the local financial system from 14 per cent in 1995 
to 45 per cent in 2000 (CEPAL, 2001). The public services sector (electricity, gas, and 
water) became the second most attractive sector for foreign investors, representing 
24 per cent of GDP in 1996-2001 (Ffrench-Davis, 2003). The service sector represented 
50 per cent of the GDP for the period 1996-2001 when the electricity, gas and water 
industries are included. 
5.4. Reactions of MNEs -the CSR approach
The responses of MNEs to the policy shifts taking place in the Chilean environment and 
the opportunities created by the potential to invest in the services sector through the 
infrastructure concessions program show that MNEs are developing links with local 
communities (Richards, 1997). This reflects a more apolitical stance taken by MNEs. 
Whereas in earlier eras MNEs had aligned with dominant hierarchies, their concerns now 
are to align their investments with the neo-structuralist agenda; forging a better union 
between economic growth, equity and democracy. At the same time this approach is 
consistent with the strategic approach of MNEs, anxious to prove their worth as good 
corporate citizens (Vernon, 1998).
6. Conclusions
Chile has experienced violent policy shifts during its relations with MNEs. In this paper 
we discussed two periods of investment domination by Britain (1822-1918) and then the 
United States (1919-1973). The development of political ideologies as a response to this 
foreign dominance is a defining moment in the emergence of nationalist sentiment in Chile 
which led to the emergence of dependency/socialist movements where the State became 
more deeply involved in the economy, initiating land reforms, nationalization of foreign 
enterprises and income redistribution. In the third section we discussed the period 1974 
to the present dating from the military coup headed by Augustus Pinochet. During this 
period extreme economic orthodoxy in an attempt to attract foreign investment back to 
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Chile after the post-coup repression. We then categorized the responses of MNEs during 
these periods of investment. These responses varied; from enclave responses during the 
investment domination period by British and US investors; to the political risk insurance 
responses as the threat of expropriation became real during the dependency socialist 
period. Finally, we noted an emerging trend in MNE investment in Chile, drawing on previous 
research. In an apparently benign climate of investment, MNEs in the service sector are 
developing corporate social responsibility linkages with local entities to engender loyalty 
from the local community. 
It behooves managers to maintain cognizance about the shifts in the political and 
economic landscape in which they operate. While political risk analysis (metrics) may 
seem to be a useful tool in which to assess the riskiness of an investment prospect 
it is only a blunt tool (Bremmer & Keat, 2009). Political risk analysts may overlook key 
sources of changes (if they are not factored into the variables selected for inclusion). 
Political risk analysts failed to see the direction of change in the Iranian revolution in 1979 
(Kennedy, 1984) and the deposition of the Shah, because the political aspirations of a 
dominant religious grouping were not included in the risk analysis. As the Kennecott and 
Anaconda cases showed, firms apparently choose either to interpret the same information 
differently, or they are inclined, whatever the evidence, to take an optimistic or pessimistic 
view. As it turned out the pessimistic view of having the life rafts ready was an appropriate 
perspective in the circumstances. Although the threat of large scale expropriations seems 
unlikely in the present benign climate towards FDI it would be indeed be foolish not to 
continue to be vigilant. 
In this paper, we offered some contributions to theory suggesting that past actions of a 
host country government cannot be considered as a useful predictor of future actions. We 
also suggest that in order to understand political systems managers need to understand 
how a political system works in a given country which is based on a well-developed 
information system and sound decision making regarding the international operations of 
the firm. They also need to understand the sequential process of risk formation which will 
assist firms to develop and execute appropriate risk management policies.
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